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The Evidentiary Predicate for Affirmative
Action after Croson: A Proposal for
Shifting the Burdens of Proof*
David S. Cohen
Despite popular commentary to the contrary,' the Supreme
Court's recent decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 2 does not
signal the end of voluntary affirmative action in America. Although
the Court did indeed strike down Richmond, Virginia's minority
business set-aside program on constitutional grounds, Croson none-
theless represents the first recognition in a Supreme Court majority
opinion that race-conscious affirmative action is, in some circum-
stances, a constitutionally permissible tool for remedying the effects
of prior racial discrimination. 3 Justice O'Connor, the author of the
* This article was written and accepted for publication before the Supreme Court's
decision in JW'ards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonmo, 490 U.S. , No. 1387 (June 5, 1989). Although
that decision involves the allocation of the burden of proof in Title VII cases, it does not
affect the proposal in this Current Topic.-Eds.
1. See, e.g., Fein & Reynolds, A Kinder, Gentler Affirmative Action, Legal Times,
Feb. 13, 1989, at 16; Wilson, The Political and Ideological Question of Affirmative Ac-
tion, Boston Globe, Jan. 29, 1989, at A23; Bias Toward Confusion, L.A. Times, Jan. 25,
1989, Pt. 2, at 6. But see Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After
City of Richmond v.].A. Croson (authored by Laurence Tribe and twenty-six other constitu-
tional scholars) 98 Yale L.J. 1711 (1989)[hereinafter Joint Statement]; Lawyers: Don't
Abandon Set-Asides, Boston Globe, March 31, 1989, at 21.
2. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
3. The three significant prior affirmative action decisions based on the Constitution
were Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking
down affirmative action plan of public medical school reserving quota for minorities),
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding 10% set-aside for minority busi-
nesses contained in $4 billion Congressional public works program), and Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (rejecting school system's layoff
scheme favoring black teachers with less seniority over white teachers with more senior-
ity). The Court failed to render a majority opinion in any of these cases. Nevertheless,
the various concurring and dissenting opinions in these cases and the opinions of the
Court in similar cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, e.g., John-
son v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Work-
ers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986), and United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), clearly indicate that the Court had embraced carefully con-
structed affirmative action as a vitally important tool to achieve racial equality. See Ed-
wards, The Future of Affirmative Action in Employment, 44 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 763,
777 (1987).
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majority opinion in Croson, concluded by noting that "[n]othing we
say today precludes a state or local entity from taking action to rec-
tify the effects of identified discrimination within its jurisdiction....
In the extreme case, some form of narrowly tailored racial prefer-
ence might be necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclu-
sion." 4 Racial classifications in affirmative action plans, the Court
held, are henceforth subject to strict scrutiny, 5 but apparently not to
scrutiny that is "strict in theory but fatal in fact."
6
Although Croson finally settled the larger debate regarding the
constitutionality of affirmative action, many issues remain unre-
solved. Most importantly, the Court has failed to define the charac-
ter and amount of evidence of prior discrimination that a public en-
tity must gather before adopting a voluntary affirmative action
program. To pass constitutional scrutiny, a legislative 7 affirmative
action program must be based on a sufficient evidentiary predicate
of prior discrimination and be narrowly tailored to remedy the iden-
tified problem." The Croson Court struck down Richmond's minor-
ity business set-aside program because the City failed the evid-
4. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 729 (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
White and Kennedy, JJ.).
5. Id. at 721; see also id. at 735 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("[Tihe strict scrutiny rule is consistent with our precedents .. "); id. (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) ("I agree with . . . the Court's . . . conclusion that strict
scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classifications by race .. "). When a legis-
lative classification is subjected to strict scrutiny by the courts, it is upheld only if the
classification serves a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432, 439-42 (1985). See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). This Current Topic
addresses only the first prong of this inquiry-the evidentiary predicate for affirmative
action. Tailoring is beyond the scope of this Current Topic. See infra note 22.
6. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972)). See Croson,
109 S. Ct. at 729; id. at 734 (KennedyJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) ("rule of automatic invalidity for racial preferences in almost every case would be
a significant break with our precedents").
7. This Current Topic takes affirmative action programs adopted by state and local
legislatures as its model for analysis. Programs adopted by Congress apparently are
subject to somewhat relaxed constitutional scrutiny, since Congress acts pursuant to
"the unique remedial powers of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"
when it implements an affirmative action program. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 718 (O'Connor,
J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.). See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483-84 (Burger,
C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.) (set-aside for minority businesses in Public Works
Employment Act supported, in part, by Congress' unique powers under § 5).
8. See, e.g., lI',gant, 476 U.S. at 274 (PowellJ., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist
and O'Connor, JJ.); id. at 301-02 (Marshall,J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Black-
mun, JJ.).
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entiary predicate prong of this test: ' Richmond presented "no direct
evidence of race discrimination on the part of the city in letting con-
tracts or any evidence that the city's prime contractors had discrimi-
nated against minority-owned subcontractors."' 0 While criticizing
the factual predicate"' proffered by the City in great detail,' 12 the
Court failed to clarify what Richmond or other public actors must
show in order to survive constitutional review. State and local legis-
latures considering the adoption of affirmative action plans, as well
as courts reviewing such plans, need clear direction regarding the
kind of evidence that will satisfy the evidentiary predicate require-
ment. In the absence of satisfactory guidance from the Court on
this question, the fate of existing and future affirmative action pro-
grams remains uncertain.
This Current Topic proposes that courts adopt a "shifting-of-the-
burdens" technique, similar to that employed in disparate treatment
litigation under Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,'3 to resolve the issue of the evidentiary predicate required
for voluntary race-based affirmative action. Under this proposal, a
plaintiff challenging an affirmative action plan would bear the initial
burden of production to show that an explicit racial classification
exists in the program at issue. If the plaintiff carries this burden, the
burden of production shifts to the defendant to produce evidence
that it concluded, from evidence that it had gathered to the point of
the plan's adoption, that a compelling governmental interest would
be served by the program. If the defendant carries this burden, the
plaintiff can then attempt to rebut this assertion of legitimacy by
producing additional evidence that the intent of the legislature was
not to achieve such a purpose. The burden of persuasion, as distin-
guished from the burden of production, remains on the plaintiff
throughout the litigation.
9. The majority only briefly criticized the tailoring of Richmond's plan, noting at the
outset that "it is almost impossible to assess whether the Richmond Plan is narrowly
tailored to remedy prior discrimination since it is not linked to identified discrimination
in any way." Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 728.
10. Id. at 714.
11. In this Current Topic, "evidentiary predicate," "factual predicate," and "show-
ing" will be used interchangeably. The reader should note that these terms are not
intended to correspond precisely to the "particularized, contemporaneous finding of
discrimination" that Justice O'Connor discusses in her concurrence in lVyganl. See 1 'V-
gaul, 476 U.S. at 289. Indeed, the difference between such a "finding" of discrimination
that Justice O'Connor discusses and the "evidentiary predicate" that is discussed here is
particularly important. See infra Section IV(B)(2).
12. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 724-28.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 792 (1973); see infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
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This procedural regime is consistent with both burden-allocation
and affirmative-action case law. In addition, this distribution of bur-
dens will promote certainty and regularity in the inquiry into the
evidentiary foundation for affirmative action. Just as the burden-
shifting technique was adopted in Title VII litigation "to bring or-
der out of a chaotic situation that had developed within the lower
courts,"' 4 adoption of the proposal presented here will assist the
expeditious and fair adjudication of challenges to affirmative action.
I. The Evidentiary Predicate Requirement
A. The Purposes of the Evidentiary Predicate Requirement
The Court is in general agreement, as it has been since affirmative
action was first challenged in Bakke, that some form of an evidentiary
predicate of prior discrimination must be assembled before a legis-
lature may enact an affirmative action program. '5 While the precise
formulations of the showing requirement vary among Justices and
opinions, ' the reasons advanced in support of this requirement are
consistent.
First, the showing requirement serves to define the nature of the'
injury that the legislature seeks to redress. Affirmative action is war-
ranted, the Court has held, only to achieve either of two compelling
governmental interests: to redress the current effects of prior dis-
crimination by the government itself' 7 or to prevent the government
from being a "passive participant" in private discrimination.' 8 An
adequate evidentiary backdrop permits courts to determine whether
14. 2 A. Larson, Employment Discrimination: Procedures and Remedies § 50-10, at
10-4 (1988).
15. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-309 (PowellJ., announcing the judgment of the Court);
id. at 361 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). The plurality in ll'gant noted, "the Court has
insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination ... before allowing limited use of
racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination." 476 U.S. at 274 (Powell,
J., joined by Burger C.J., and Rehnquist and O'Connor,. J.).
16. See infra Section I(B).
17. Ilygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (Powell J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist and
O'Connor, JJ.); id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment); id. at 302 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).
18. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 720, 727. The Croson Court remarked favorably on a Sixth
Circuit opinion, Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 171 (6th Cir. 1983), that
adopted the passive participation rationale. Croson at 725-26. See also Note, The
Nonperpetuation of Discrimination in Public Contracting: A Justification for State and
Local Minority Business Set-Asides after Jl'gant, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1797 (1988) (propos-
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the purpose of the affirmative action program was sufficiently com-
pelling, thereby "ensur[ing] that new forms of invidious discrimina-
tion are not approved in the guise of remedial affirmative action."'
As will be developed in greater detail below,20 judicial review of af-
firmative action programs is primarily an inquiry into the intent of
the legislature adopting the plan; the evidentiary predicate require-
ment provides the grist for this inquiry.
Second, an adequate evidentiary basis is necessary to tailor an af-
firmative action plan appropriately. The Court in Croson, criticizing
Richmond's evidentiary predicate, pointed out that "a generalized
assertion that there has been past discrimination . . . provides no
guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the
injury it seeks to remedy. '" 2' Moreover, the lack of a sound eviden-
tiary predicate prevents a court, when the constitutionality of the
plan is litigated, from assessing whether the means employed are
sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet proper legislative goals.
22
Finally, policy concerns also animate the evidentiary predicate re-
quirement. As Justice Powell noted in his concurrence in Fullilove,
"[r]espect and support for the law, especially in an area as sensitive
as this, depend in large measure upon the public's perception of
fairness. It therefore is important that the legislative record sup-
porting race-conscious remedies contain evidence that satisfies fair-
minded people that the congressional action is just." 23 Affirmative
19. Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 508 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124
(1981). See also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 534-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The finding re-
quirement has also been defended as especially important when local governments
adopt affirmative action plans. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. City & County
of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 1987) (arguing that local legislatures
should be required to gather extensive evidence of discrimination before acting to rem-
edy that discrimination because "the narrower a government's domain, the greater the
likelihood of oppression .. ").
20. See infra text accompanying notes 36-37.
21. 109 S. Ct. at 723. See also Days, Fullilove, 96 Yale LJ. 453, 458 (1986) (Affirma-
tive action plans that "have not been openly adopted .. .have not benefited from the
scrutiny and testing of means to ends assured by public deliberation.").
22. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 728-29 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White
and Kennedy, JJ.). Tailoring, as noted above, supra note 5, is beyond the scope of this
Current Topic. Briefly, however, courts analyze the means selected to achieve legitimate
state interests on two grounds: first, whether the burden imposed on innocent third
parties is too great (i.e., whether less burdensome, equally effective alternative remedies
are available); and second, whether the affirmative action plan affords sufficient flexibil-
ity in application to assure that it achieves only its explicit and legitimate goals. See
Wlyganl, 476 U.S. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
23. 448 U.S. at 507 n.8 (Powell,J., concurring) (citations omitted). Alexander Ham-
ilton, in The Federalist Papers, warned:
[N]o man can be sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice,
by which he may be a gainer today. And every man must now feel that the inevitable
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action plans, after all, are designed to remedy a national disgrace
through means that are themselves deeply troubling; establishing
the wisdom of such plans by developing an adequate evidentiary
predicate is certainly nothing less than sound public policy.24
B. The Court's Formulation of the Evidentiary Predicate Requirement
Although the Court is in general agreement regarding the pur-
poses served by the showing requirement, the Justices have been
unable to agree on a precise verbal formulation for a standard. The
Court's failure to settle on one definition of the evidentiary predi-
cate requirement-let alone to give content to that definition-re-
flects the futility of the Court's current approach to the question.
The various opinions in Fullilove, Wygant, and Croson all demonstrate
that the Court conceives of the evidentiary predicate requirement in
quantitative terms. That is, if a sufficient quantity of evidence exists,
then the predicate for affirmative action exists. The current debate
concerns the definition of sufficiency, not the validity of the quanti-
tative approach.
In Wygant, for example, Justice Powell's plurality opinion inter-
preted the evidentiary predicate requirement as demanding that a
legislature have either "convincing evidence," "sufficient evidence,"
or "a strong basis in evidence" to conclude that affirmative action is
appropriate.2 5 In Justice O'Connor's view, the finding requirement
would be satisfied if the legislature had "a sufficient basis for con-
cluding" or "a firm basis for determining" that remedial action was
tendency of such a spirit is to sap the foundations of public and private confidence
and to introduce in its stead universal distrust and distress.
The Federalist No. 78, at 470 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
24. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 730 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White
and Kennedy, JJ.) ("[Flindings also serve to assure all citizens that the deviation from
the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a
measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself."); see also Days, supra note 21,
at 460 ("Our national sensitivity to racial classifications requires that they be used only
when they represent a focused effort to remedy the effects of racial discrimination and to
prevent its recurrence."). The factual predicate requirement has also been defended as
a means to assure that affirmative action programs are not used to dole out special bene-
fits to key constituents. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 733 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (affirmative action "ordinance might be nothing more
than a form of patronage"); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 539 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (If affirma-
tive action programs are not required to be remedial, they would constitute a "legisla-
tive preference for almost any ethnic, religious, or racial group with the political
strength to negotiate 'a piece of the action' for its members."); see Brief Amicus Curiae,
of Mountain States Legal Foundation at 10, City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.
Ct. 706 (1989) (No. 87-998) (same).
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warranted.2" Finally, Justice Marshall viewed the standard as requir-
ing "a legitimate factual predicate" for affirmative action.2 7 While
the Justices could not agree on language, each opinion in Wygant
groped for a quantitative definition of the evidentiary predicate
requirement.
28
The Court's recent opinion in Croson, moreover, did not settle the
matter.2'- Rather, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion simply recast
the existing formulations in new language. After criticizing Rich-
mond's evidentiary predicate as "generalized assertion[s]," "obser-
vation[s]," and "amorphous claim[s]," 30 she concluded that "[n]one
of these 'findings,' singly or together, provide the city of Richmond
with a 'strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial ac-
tion was necessary.' There is nothing approaching a prima facie
case of a constitutional or statutory violation by anyone in the Rich-
mond construction industry."-3 1 Responding to Justice Marshall's
characterization of the evidentiary predicate requirement as simply
an "onerous documentary obligation,"32 Justice O'Connor went on
to assert that public actors "must identify [prior] discrimination,
26. Id. at 291-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 297 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).
28. This verbal potpourri began in Fullilove. There, the plurality opinion authored
by ChiefJustice Burger found that Congress had satisfied the evidentiary predicate re-
quirement because it "had [an] abundant historical basis from which it could conclude
that traditional procurement practices, when applied to minority businesses, could per-
petuate the effects of prior discrimination." 448 U.S. at 478 (Burger, CJ., joined by
White and Powell, JJ.). Justice Powell contended that the Court had never, and never
should, "approve[] race-conscious remedies absentjudicial, administrative, or legislative
findings of constitutional or statutory violations." Id. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall asserted that voluntary affirmative action is justified "only by showing
'an important and articulated purpose for its use.' " Id. at 519 (Marshall,J, concurring,
joined by Brennan and Blackmun,JJ.) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361 (opinion of Bren-
nan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun,JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part)).
29. The briefs submitted in Croson did not themselves offer much in the way of a
certain definition for the evidentiary predicate requirement. See, e.g., Brief of Appellee
at 17, City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (No. 87-998) ("[I]fthe
race-based action is taken to remedy past discrimination by the governmental body, then
a fact finder must be able to determine whether the employer was justified in instituting
a remedial plan."); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant
at 16, City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (No. 87-998) (affirma-
tive action justified "only if a prior history of unlawful discriminatory action, whose ef-
fects are to be remedied, has been identified with some particularity"); Reply Brief for
Appellant City of Richmond at 11, City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706
(1989) (No. 87-998) ("a government need only have evidence of discrimination suffi-
cient to ensure that its plan is truly remedial").
30. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723-24.
31. Id. at 724 (emphasis and citations omitted).
32. Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).
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Although Croson clearly presented the question of what would sat-
isfy the evidentiary predicate requirement, the Court failed to end a
decade of verbal imprecision and legal confusion when it declined
to provide a single, workable definition for this requirement.3 4 This
result was inevitable, given that the Croson Court continued to view
the evidentiary predicate requirement in entirely quantitative terms,
as if five (or seven or ten) instances of discrimination along with a
statistical study (or maybe two) constituted "a strong basis in evi-
dence." The Court's efforts will continue to be fruitless as long as
the Court formulates the evidentiary predicate requirement in
purely quantitative terms. By framing the requirement in procedural
terms, however, the Court could give real content to the evidentiary
predicate requirement..3 5 Drawing on the procedural regimes devel-
oped for Title VII and constitutional antidiscrimination litigation,
the Court should implement a burden-shifting regime to resolve
controversies concerning the evidentiary predicate for voluntary af-
firmative action. As a result, the evidentiary predicate requirement
would become a coherent and useful guide for legislatures contem-
plating affirmative action and courts reviewing such programs.
33. Id. at 727.
34. Justice Marshall foresaw that the lower federal courts would have to struggle to
find some common, intelligible principle in the Court's many opinions. llyganl, 476
U.S. at 312 n.7 (Marshall,J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun,JJ.) ("I do not
envy the District Court its task of sorting out what this Court has and has not held to-
day."). Indeed, the jurisprudence of the lower courts has been far from uniform. See,
e.g., J. Edinger & Son, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 802 F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir. 1986)
("[T]he City should be required to present evidence of invidious discrimination.");
South Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 723 F.2d 846, 851-52 (11 th Cir.) ("[Aldequate findings [must] have been made
to ensure that the governmental body is remedying the present effects of past discrimina-
tion .. ") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984); Michigan Road Build-
ers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583, 589-90 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[T]his court must
decide whether the Michigan Legislature, based upon the evidentiary factual record
before it, 'had a firm basis for believing that such action was required based on prior
discrimination' by the state itself."), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1333 (1989).
35. Indeed, the Crosoni Court, by discussing a "prima facie case of a constitutional or
statutory violation," hinted that a procedural approach to the evidentiary predicate
question is in order. 109 S. Ct. at 724.
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IL The Evidentiary Predicate as a Burden-Shifting Regime
A. The Purposes of Burden-Shifting
At root, the inquiry into the evidentiary predicate for affirmative
action is a question of legislative intent. A court reviewing an af-
firmative action program ultimately must determine whether the
legislature's motive in adopting a race-conscious plan was to achieve
a compelling governmental interest. In Croson, Justice O'Connor
defended the application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action plans
by arguing that "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry into the justifica-
tion for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of deter-
mining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics." 3 6 Any workable conceptualiza-
tion of the evidentiary predicate requirement must, therefore, rec-
ognize that the ultimate factual issue in affirmative action litigation
is the defendant legislature's motivation. 37
Inquiries into the intent of an actor, of course, are notoriously
difficult. 3 8 To begin with, only the actor has access to the relevant
evidence. 39 Even when some "hard evidence" exists, it is often diffi-
cult to infer intent from action, for a particular action could be moti-
vated by any number of rationales. To complicate matters further,
assessing the intent of a complex deliberative body such as a legisla-
ture presents its own host of problems. 40 The wide range of infor-
mation that is taken into account and the dispersed responsibility
36. Id. at 721 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and White and Kennedy, JJ.)
(emphasis added). Justice O'Connor continued: "Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny
is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race b)Fassuring that the legislative body is pursuing
a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool." Id.
37. See Choper, Continued Uncertainty as to the Constitutionality of Remedial Ra-
cial Classifications: Identifying the Pieces of the Puzzle, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 255, 265 (1987)
("[T]he trial court must make a factual determination that the [actor] had a[n] [adequate
evidentiary basis] for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary."). Cf Player,
The Evidentiary Nature of Defendant's Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases,
49 Mo. L. Rev. 17, 22 (1984) ("ultimate factual issue in disparate treatment cases [under
Title VII] is the defendant's motivation").
38. Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a The-
ory of Procedural Justice, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1205, 1280 (1981) ("Intent is rarely suscepti-
ble to direct proof; rather, it must be inferred from a totality of circumstances.").
39. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980) ("[W]hether [good-faith]
immunity has been established depends on facts peculiarly within the knowledge and
control of the defendant.").
40. See generallyJ. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory ofJudicial Review 130-34
(1980) (each representative in the legislative process may have a different motivation for
supporting a statute); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 870 (1930)
("That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense is almost an
immediate inference from a statement of the proposition.").
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for action-the institutional strengths of legislative decision mak-
ing4 l-impede efforts to determine intent. Despite the difficulties,
the constitutional demand that public actors have an adequate evi-
dentiary predicate before adopting an affirmative action program re-
quires an inquiry into intent.
Employing a procedural burden-shifting technique to test the evi-
dentiary predicate would help "smoke out" 42 a public actor's intent
in enacting an affirmative action program by focusing the court's
and the litigants' attention on the issue of legislative intent. As the
Supreme Court has noted, the allocation of burdens of proof, both
the burden of persuasion 4 3 and the burden of production,
44 "is, of
course, rarely without consequence and frequently may be disposi-
tive to the outcome of the litigation. ."45 Moreover, because evi-
dence of intent is frequently not conclusive, burden allocation is
especially important when intent is the ultimate factual issue in the
litigation.
46
Normally, the plaintiff bears both the burden of production and
the burden of persuasion in civil matters; the party seeking judicial
4 1. See Note, Principles of Competence: The Ability of Public Institutions to Adopt
Remedial Affirmative Action Plans, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 581, 602-06 (1986). See also Fulli-
love, 448 U.S. at 502-03 (Powell,J., concurring) (Congress "has no responsibility to con-
fine its vision to the facts and evidence adduced by particular parties. Instead, its special
attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission to investigate and consider all
facts and opinions that may be relevant to the resolution of an issue."); id. at 520 n.4
(Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.) ("Congress is engaged
in the broad mission of framing general social rules, not adjudicating individual dis-
putes."). Congress' "special attribute" is shared by legislatures at the state and local
levels.
42. Golden v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838, 849 (5th Cir. 1975) (burden of
production "can be an effective means to 'smoke out' a party with peculiar knowledge of
the facts").
43. The burden of persuasion, or "the risk of nonpersuasion," 9 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2485 (rev. ed. 1981), "contains the dual elements of location and weight: the location
specifies the party who will lose if the burden is not met, and the weight specifies how
persuasive the evidence must be to sustain this burden." Belton, supra note 38, at 1207.
In civil litigation, the usual formulation for the weight of the burden of persuasion is that
there must be a preponderance of the evidence in favor of the party bearing the burden.
Whether the party bearing the burden of persuasion has satisfied that burden is a ques-
tion for the fact-finder to determine. See generally C. McCormick, McCormick on Evi-
dence §§ 336, 339-41 (3d ed. 1984).
44. The burden of production, or the risk of nonproduction, provides that when the
party bearing the burden fails to introduce evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable
jury of the existence of a fact in issue, the party with the burden loses. Unlike the bur-
den of persuasion, whether the burden of production is satisfied is determined by the
judge. Belton, supra note 38, at 1207-08. See generally McCormick, snpra note 43, §§ 336,
338.
45. Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976).
46. See Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a Finding of Unitariness in School
Desegregation Litigation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 653, 653-54 (1988) [hereinafter Allocating
the Burden].
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intervention to change the status quo typically is required to justify
the request. 47 Courts, however, are not hesitant to reallocate both
burdens in order to achieve the purposes of the underlying substan-
tive law and to fulfill notions of good public policy. 48 In fact, be-
yond the basic approach, the Supreme Court has noted that "[t]here
are no hard-and-fast standards governing the allocation of the bur-
den of proof in every situation. The issue, rather, 'is merely a ques-
tion of policy and fairness based on experience in the different
situations.' "49
Courts consider a variety of factors when reallocating burdens.
First, and most importantly, considerations of fairness influence the
allocation of the burden of production. The party with superior and
readier access to knowledge about a relevant fact ought to bear the
burden of production. 50  Put simply, "[i]f the evidence is in his
favor, he will have every incentive to make it known. If it goes
against him, his silence will seal his defeat." 5' Second, matters of
substantive law also inform the placement of the burdens. For ex-
ample, a defendant relying on what courts perceive as a disfavored
contention of law will often bear both burdens on that issue .5 2
Third, courts often "require the party who is more likely to be
wrong to plead the issue and to prove the relevant facts. ' '5- 1 Fourth,
the desire to expedite trials, especially trials with complex and diffi-
cult factual backgrounds, often calls for a shift in the burden of pro-
duction. 54 Finally, courts are concerned with the proper "allocation
47. Allen, Presumptions, Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal Civil Actions-
An Anatomy of Unnecessary Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 76 Nw. U.L. Rev.
892, 896 (1982). See generallv McCormick, supra note 43, § 337.
48. Allen, supra note 47, at 898; Belton, supra note 38, at 1283.
49. Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973) (quoting 9J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 2486 (3d. ed. 1940)). See, e.g., Gomez, 446 U.S. at 641 (burden of producing
evidence of subjective good faith is on police officer claiming the defense, not on plain-
tiff); see also F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 7.8 (3d ed. 1985); Allen, supra note
47, at 896.
50. James & Hazard, supra note 49, § 7.8.
51. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 556, 579 (1973). One
of the best known burden-shifts in the service of public policy occurred in Summers v.
Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). There, the California Supreme Court placed the
burden of proof on each defendant to prove that his buckshot had not injured the plain-
tiff because the two defendants were in the best position to know.
52. An example of a "disfavored contention" is contributory negligence. See Epstein,
supra note 51, at 578. See generally McCormick, supra note 43, § 337. The purpose of this
rule of allocation is "to avoid the disfavored result [by] requir[ing] the defendant to
plead the issue in his answer and to prove it at trial .... Epstein, supra note 51, at 578.
53. Epstein, supra note 51, at 580 (citing Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay
on juristic Immaturity, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 12-14 (1959)).
54. Allen, supra note 47, at 895. See Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24
(1978) (per curiam).
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of error costs." 55 Placement of the burden of persuasion reflects a
policy judgment regarding how a suit should be resolved in the case
of uncertainty.
5 6
B. Representative Uses of Burden-Shifting Regimes
The Court has adopted burden-shifting regimes to assist the in-
quiry into the motivation of an allegedly discriminatory actor in sev-
eral areas of antidiscrimination law. For example, in Title VII
disparate treatment litigation, 57 the ultimate factual issue is the em-
ployer's motivation for rejecting a job applicant. To help identify
the employer's intent, the Court has implemented a burden-shifting
mechanism that places the initial burden of production on the plain-
tiff to show that she was denied a job for which she was qualified. 58
Once the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case of discrimination,
the burden of production then shifts to the employer to "articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejec-
tion." 59 If the employer carries this burden, the burden then reverts
to the plaintiff to show that the employer's "stated reason for [the]
rejection was in fact pretext."' 6 The shifting burden of production
is designed to illuminate the employer's motivation in rejecting the
plaintiff's job application.
Similarly, in school desegregation litigation where dejure segrega-
tion does not exist, but actions of the school board create defacto
segregation, the school board's liability under the equal protection
clause turns on the board's intent."' Accordingly, the Court fash-
ioned a burden-shifting regime requiring the plaintiff, who initially
bears both burdens, to show deliberate racial segregation in a"meaningful portion" of the school district.6 2 If the plaintiff carries
this burden, a prima facie case of unconstitutional segregation ex-
ists, and both burdens of proof shift to the school board to show
55. Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective
Ideal, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 728, 786-87 (1986).
56. Allocating the Burden, supra note 46, at 657.
57. Litigation under § 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(l), is termed "disparate treatment" litigation. Section 703(a)(1) provides: "It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. .. "
58. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
59. Id. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 (only the burden of production shifts to
the defendant).
60. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
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that segregation elsewhere in the district was not also caused by "in-
tentionally segregative actions." 63 The purpose of this mechanism,
as in Title VII disparate treatment litigation, is to discover the rele-
vant actor's intent.64 The inquiry into the legislature's motivation in
adopting an affirmative action plan compelled by the evidentiary
predicate requirement calls for a similar procedural mechanism.
III. A Burden-Shifting Regime for the Evidentiary Predicate Requirement
The ultimate factual inquiry in affirmative action litigation under
the equal protection clause 65 is whether the evidence of prior dis-
crimination considered by a legislature was sufficiently strong to
sustain the legislature's claim that it adopted a race-conscious rem-
edy to achieve a compelling governmental interest. The following
burden-shifting regime would assist a court in making this complex
factual determination. 66
As a preliminary matter, the court must determine whether the
challenged legislation is indeed an affirmative action plan or, on the
63. Id. See Allocating the Burden, supra note 46 (proposing a burden-shifting alloca-
tion for litigation of school segregation claims after a court determination of
unitariness).
64. The Court developed similar burden-shifting techniques to adjudicate claims of
retaliatory firings for exercise of first amendment rights and for disparate impact claims
based on the Constitution's equal protection clause. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (if plaintiff carries burden of showing that exercise of
first amendment rights motivated firing, burden of persuasion shifts to defendant to
show firing would have occurred absent plaintiff's protected conduct); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977) (in constitutional disparate impact suit, if plaintiff shows
defendant's intent to discriminate underlies disparate impact, burden shifts to defendant
to prove that race-neutral criteria produced discriminatory result).
65. Affirmative action plans may also be challenged under Title VII. In such suits,
courts use a burden-shifting approach drawn from the burden-shifting regime devel-
oped for Title VII disparate treatment litigation. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626-27. This pro-
cedure, however, deviates from the burden-shifting regime proposed here for
constitutional challenges to affirmative action plans. As the Court in Johnson held, "[tihe
fact that a public employer must also satisfy the Constitution does not negate the fact
that the statutory prohibition with which that employer must contend was not intended to
extend as far as that of the Constitution." Id. at 627-28 n.6 (emphasis in original). That
is, affirmative action plans challenged under Title VII are subject to less stringent review
than plans challenged under the Constitution. But see id. at 664-65 & n.3 (Scalia, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and White, J., dissenting) (Title VII and the Constitution im-
pose equivalently severe limits on public employer's ability to adopt affirmative action
plans); id. at 649 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (same). The paradigm
presented here, since it fulfills Crosont's demand that affirmative action challenged under
the equal protection clause survive strict scrutiny, is not designed to assess the legality
under Title VII of affirmative action.
66. As with the burden shifting regimes for Title VII, the procedure proposed here
does not call for a 'judicial minuet" in which the progress of the case strictly tracks the
shifting burdens of production. Rather, what is proposed here is a technique for post hoc
analysis by the court. See Larson, supra note 14.
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contrary, is simply an invidious racial classification defended as an
affirmative action plan. 6 7 The burden-shifting paradigm presented
here is designed to facilitate the strict scrutiny of affirmative action
plans only; any other racial classification in legislation merits tradi-
tional strict scrutiny. 68 Once the court is satisfied that the chal-
lenged legislation is an affirmative action plan, the initial burden of
production rests on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the program
has taken race into account. 69 Presumably, for most affirmative ac-
tion programs, this showing would be quite easily accomplished.
70
If the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden of production, but
not the burden of persuasion, shifts to the defendant to introduce
evidence that the adoption of the affirmative action program was
motivated by a desire to achieve one of the two recognized govern-
mental interests-either to ameliorate the present effects of past
governmental discrimination or to end government complicity in
private industry discrimination. If the affirmative action plan is de-
fended on the first ground, then the government should introduce a
study, of which the legislators were aware when the program was
adopted, showing a statistically significant disparity between minor-
ity and non-minority receipt of governmental benefits. 7' The legis-
lature should also introduce evidence of its contemporaneous
conclusions-based on some array of testimony taken, studies per-
formed by or on behalf of the government, administrative findings,
court decisions, or other similar evidence-that the government
unit involved had engaged in prior discrimination.
7 2
67. Most legislation containing a racial classification would be easily categorized as
either an affirmative action plan or not. The plain language of the statute would indicate
its purpose. Nevertheless, if an invidious racial classification were reviewed as an affirm-
ative action plan under the procedures presented here, the statute would fail; the legisla-
ture would be unable to meet its burden of production of showing that the statute was
enacted to achieve a compelling governmental purpose.
68. On the relationship between strict scrutiny in the affirmative action context and
traditional strict scrutiny, see infra Section IV(A).
69. If classifications by race or ethnicity do not appear on the face of the statute,
then a constitutional disparate impact challenge would proceed under the doctrine
enunciated in Davis, 426 U.S. at 229, and Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 252, supra note 64.
70. Affirmative action plans based on criteria other than race, such as the set-aside
for disadvantaged business enterprises contained in the Small Business Administration
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 631 et seq., should not be subject to strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the
procedure described here, as well as the strictures of Croson, would not apply to the
analysis of such programs. But see Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 707 F.
Supp. 1010 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (applying Crosoni to invalidate a set-aside for socially and
economically disadvantaged businesses).
71. This demonstration would constitute a showing of the "present effects."
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If the affirmative action plan is defended as achieving the second
compelling interest-the termination of governmental complicity in
private industry discrimination-then the legislature should intro-
duce statistical evidence of which the legislators were aware when
the program was adopted. Such evidence should constitute a prima
facie case of disparate impact under Title VII 73 or the equal protec-
tion clause, or a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title
VII.74 The defendant should also introduce evidence of a contem-
poraneous legislative conclusion-again based on some array of tes-
timony taken, studies performed by or on behalf of the government,
administrative findings, court decisions, or other similar evidence-
that the government unit either funds or is otherwise passively par-
ticipating in the private industry.
If the defendant legislature meets its burden of production, that
burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the legislature
did not, in fact, intend to achieve the purported compelling interest.
The plaintiff could make this showing by producing evidence dem-
onstrating that the legislature's intent was to achieve some purpose
other than a compelling governmental interest or by demonstrating
that a rational legislative body, honestly assessing the evidence
before it, could not have concluded that race-based remedies were
necessary to achieve a compelling interest.
Throughout the litigation, the burden of persuasion remains on
the plaintiff.
IV Evaluation of the Burden-Shifting Regime
By requiring the defendant to present and defend its conclusions
regarding the existence of a factual predicate of prior discrimina-
tion, the burden-shifting regime outlined above will "sharpen the
inquiry" 75 into the legislature's motive for adopting an affirmative
action program. Beyond fulfilling the constitutional demand that a
legislature have a sound evidentiary predicate for its affirmative ac-
tion program, this procedure is entirely consistent with existing law
73. Section 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), pro-
vides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to limit, segre-
gate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin." See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
74. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. Either prima facie case would con-
stitute a showing of present discrimination in the relevant industry.
75. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8.
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regarding the allocation of burdens of proof and with constitutional
doctrine regarding the evidentiary predicate requirement.
A. Allocation of the Burdens
As noted above, courts are quite willing to allocate both the bur-
dens of production and persuasion in order to achieve important
policy goals. Accordingly, the burden allocation in the proposal
presented here is designed to address legal and policy considera-
tions surrounding affirmative action. Placement of the initial bur-
den of production on the plaintiff is, of course, only natural: as the
party requesting judicial action to change the status quo, the plain-
tiff is justifiably required to make an initial showing that a valid claim
exists. Once the plaintiff makes this showing, however, considera-
tions of fairness and efficiency dictate that the defendant legislature
produce evidence regarding the basis for its conclusion that race-
conscious relief was warranted. Placing the burden of production
on the defendant is supported by a number of considerations. First,
challenges to the constitutionality of affirmative action plans are
likely to produce complex, fact-intensive litigation. 76 Since intent is
inherently elusive, extensive factual records must be developed to
illuminate the intent of the legislature. As the Court has recog-
nized, burdens of production are appropriately placed on the party
that can help expedite the progress of complicated cases by bringing
forth evidence. 77
Second, and related, since the defendant in affirmative action liti-
gation is uniquely capable of producing evidence that bears directly
on the central inquiry of motive, considerations of fairness suggest
that the defendant should bear the interim burden of production.
76. The range of evidence that could be gathered to support an affirmative action
program is extraordinarily broad. In Croson, for instance, the City of Richmond relied
on: 1) a statistical survey of the percentage of City construction dollars awarded to mi-
nority firms compared to the percentage awarded to non-minority firms, 2) a survey of
the membership of minority construction firms in professional associations, 3) testimony
of individuals involved in the construction industry and in city government, and 4) con-
gressional findings, validated in Fullilove, that discrimination is endemic in the national
construction industry. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 724-727. See also San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922
(evidence consisted of.reports solicited by city from all city agencies and interested pri-
vate organizations, extensive public hearings, and a 172-page city report); Aetropolitan
Dade County, 723 F.2d at 853 (evidence presented included, inter a/ia, "reliable, substan-
tial information compiled by independent investigations"); Keip, 713 F.2d at 170-71 (evi-
dence included floor debates, court decision finding the State was a "joint participant"
in private industry discrimination, study completed by an independent examiner, and
study completed by the State).
77. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 249-50; see generally SweeneY, 439 U.S. 24.
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Not only does the legislature have unparalleled access to the rele-
vant information, it also has every incentive to make its motivation
known, providing, of course, that its motivation was legitimate. If
the legislature cannot present legally sufficient evidence verifying
that it intended to achieve a compelling governmental interest, that
failure will-as it should-doom the affirmative action program.
These considerations, nevertheless, do not warrant imposing the
burden of persuasion on the defendant legislature. Most importantly,
Justice O'Connor noted in Wygant that "[in 'reverse discrimination'
suits, as in any other suit, it is the plaintiffs who must bear the bur-
den of demonstrating that their rights have been violated."' 78 That
is, the burden of persuasion throughout the litigation rests on the
plaintiffs challenging the affirmative action plan.
In addition, important policy concerns related to the fulfillment of
the underlying substantive law of affirmative action counsel against
shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant. First, under
traditional strict scrutiny, legislation that contains a racial classifica-
tion is presumptively invalid. 1 Although the cases are not explicit in
this regard, the defendant seems to bear the burden of demonstrat-
ing that the classification is designed to achieve a compelling state
interest. In contrast, the plaintiff's initial showing that an affirma-
tive action plan contains a racial classification does not establish a
presumption that the plan is unconstitutional. If every affirmative
action plan were presumptively invalid, the law's embrace of affirma-
tive action to combat discrimination would be gravely impaired,,o
Justice O'Connor stressed this point in Wygant. Noting "this Court's
and Congress' consistent emphasis on the value of voluntary efforts
to further the objectives of the law," Justice O'Connor crafted her
opinion to promote "public employers' incentive to meet volunta-
rily their civil rights obligations.""' She went on to emphasize that
"[t]he value of voluntary compliance is doubly important when it is
78. 476 U.S. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626 (in both
Title VII and constitutional affirmative action litigation, plaintiff bears the burden of
persuasion).
79. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) ("Classifying persons ac-
cording to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public
concerns ... ").
80. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 364 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun,
JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Weber, 443 U.S. at 2 10-1 I
(Blackmun, J., concurring). See supra note 3.
81. llygant, 476 U.S. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at
364 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part)).
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a public employer that acts, both because of the example its volun-
tary assumption of responsibility sets and because the remediation
of governmental discrimination is of unique importance.
'" 82
Second, the opinion in Croson, while adopting strict scrutiny as the
standard for analyzing affirmative action plans, clearly indicated that
race-based remedial action, in some instances, would be constitu-
tional.83 The form of strict scrutiny adopted in Croson for affirmative
action plans stands in stark contrast to traditional strict scrutiny,
which invalidates virtually all other racial classifications.8 4 In short,
racial classifications contained in affirmative action programs do
not, standing alone, establish the legislature as a wrongdoer. Ac-
cordingly, the burden of persuasion should not shift to the defend-
ant to prove that the statute does not violate the equal protection
clause.
This point is illustrated by considering how the burden-shifting
regimes for disparate impact and disparate treatment claims under
Title VII diverge. In a disparate impact claim, once the plaintiff es-
tablishes a prima facie case that a supposedly neutral employment
practice has a disproportionate impact on a protected group, the
82. W1'ygant, 476 U.S. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The current regulations of
the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, moreover, call for
"each person subject to Title VII [to] take voluntary action to correct the effects of past
discrimination and to prevent present and future discrimination without awaiting litiga-
tion." 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1988). The EEOC regulations continue:
Voluntary affirmative action to improve opportunities for minorities and women
must be encouraged and protected in order to carry out the Congressional intent
embodied in Title VII.... Such voluntary affirmative action cannot be measured by
the standard of whether it would have been required had there been litigation, for
this standard would undermine the legislative purpose of first encouraging volun-
tary action without litigation.
Id. See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1608.3 & 1608.4.(1988).
83. The Court took pains to counter Justice Marshall's contention that the majority
viewed "racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon of the past" and that, after
Croson, "government bodies need no longer preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial
injustice." 109 S. Ct. at 752 (Marshall,J.,joined by Brennan and BlackmunJJ., dissent-
ing). The Court explained that state and local governments "have many weapons at
their disposal both to punish and to prevent discrimination and to remove arbitrary
barriers to minority advancement," including, in appropriate circumstances, affirmative
action. 109 S. Ct. 721. See also supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
84. The exceptions prove the point. Only two cases have upheld non-remedial racial
classifications: in Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, the Court let stand the Japanese internment
program during World War II because of national security imperatives; and in Lee v.
Washington, 390 U:S. 333 (1968) (per curiam), the Court approved the temporary racial
segregation of prison inmates in the aftermath of a prison race riot. Except for these
two cases, strict scrutiny indeed has been strict in theory but fatal in fact. See supra note 6
and accompanying text.
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burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to show the "job-relat-
edness" of the practice.8 5 Because the plaintiff's prima facie case of
adverse impact alone, in the absence of a legally sufficient defense,
entitles the plaintiff to relief, the burden of persuasion-as well as
the burden of production-shifts; in other words, the plaintiff's
prima facie case establishes the defendant as a wrongdoer.8 6 In con-
trast, when the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in disparate
treatment litigation, 7 the burden of production, but not the burden
of persuasion, shifts to the defendant to "articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for the purported employment discrimi-
nation.8 18 The plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate treatment
does not establish a presumption that the defendant acted illegally.
Without evidence of illicit motive on behalf of the employer, being
denied ajob for which one is qualified does not entitle one to relief
85. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (employer must "prove[] that the
challenged requirements are job related"); Albermarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425 (em-
ployer must "meet the burden of proving that its tests are 'job related' "); Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 432 ("Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.") (em-
phasis added in each). The recent plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988), blurred the distinction between disparate impact and
disparate treatment with regard to the allocation of the burden of persuasion. In hold-
ing that disparate impact analysis applies to subjective criteria for promotion, Justice
O'Connor wrote that "the ultimate burden of proving that discrimination against a pro-
tected group has been caused by a specific employment practice remains with the plain-
tiff at all times." 108 S. Ct. at 2790 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White
and Scalia, JJ.). In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun took issue with this position: "The
plurality's discussion of the allocation of burdens of proof and production that apply in
litigating a disparate impact claim . . . is flatly contradicted by our cases." 108 S. Ct. at
2792 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and concur-
ring in thejudgment). In any event,Justice O'Connor's modification of the burden allo-
cation regime established in Griggs and subsequent disparate impact cases has never
commanded a majority of the Court.
86. The Court noted in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 359-60 n.45 (1977):
Although the prima facie case did not conclusively demonstrate that all of the em-
ployer's decisions were part of the proved discriminatory pattern and practice, it did
create a greater likelihood that any single decision was a component of the overall
plan. Moreover, the finding of a pattern or practice changed the position of the
employer to that of a proved wrongdoer.
See also ll1'tson, 108 S. Ct. at 2792-94 (Blackmun,J., joined by Brennan and Marshall,JJ.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (describing and contrasting the ra-
tionale for burden-shifting in disparate impact and disparate treatment litigation).
87. A plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate treatment consists of a showing that
she belongs to a group protected by Title VII, that she applied for ajob for which she
was qualified, that she was rejected, and that the employer continued to seek applicants
for the job. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
88. Id.
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under Title VII.8() When disparate treatment is alleged, the prima
facie case does not establish the employer as a wrongdoer.n!"
Returning to the affirmative action context, the plaintiff's prima
facie case under the paradigm presented here does not, standing
alone, establish the legislature's liability; the plaintiff's initial show-
ing that race was explicitly considered in a statute does not demon-
strate that the evidentiary predicate relied upon by the legislature
was at all inadequate. Before the legislature can be regarded as a
wrongdoer, evidence that the legislature's motive was not proper
must be presented. Just as in disparate treatment claims under Title
VII, the lack of substantiation in the plaintiff's prima facie case that
the defendant was motivated by illegitimate goals counsels against
shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant.
B. The Legislature's Burden of Production
Although the defendant legislature does not bear the burden of
persuasion, the duty to produce evidence of legislative motive un-
derlying the affirmative action program constitutes a significant
check on the legislature's activity. To satisfy its burden of produc-
tion, the legislature must introduce evidence tending to showl 1 that
it reasonably concluded-based on evidence before it when the af-
firmative action plan was adopted-that race-based remedial action
was warranted. The legislature's burden of production, then, is not
to come forward with scatter-shot evidence hoping to establish an
evidentiary predicate, but rather to produce evidence focusing di-
rectly on the issue of legislative intent.
1. The Legislature's Conclusions. That the legislature must con-
clude, based on the evidence before it, that affirmative action is an
appropriate remedy for the discriminatory situation identified is
clearly established in the Court's jurisprudence. In Fullilove, the
Court found the factual basis for the challenged affirmative action
plan sufficient because the Court was "satisfied that Congress had
[an] abundant historical basis from which it could conclude that
traditional procurement practices ... could perpetuate the effects of
89. Teamnsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 ("Proof of discriminatory motive is critical" under
a disparate treatment theory.).
90. Walson, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2792-94 (Blackmun,J., joined by Brennan and Marshall,
JJ., concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment).
91. Satisfaction of the burden of production requires that the evidence produced is
of sufficient character that the judge believes that a reasonable fact-finder could con-
clude that the alleged fact exists. McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A
Function of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1382, 1385 (1955).
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prior discrimination. "1 2 Six years later, in Wygant, the Court de-
manded even more: the School Board's plan failed because the
Board did not have "a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion
that remedial action was necessary. "9 3 The Wygant Court required
not simply that the public actor could have concluded that affirmative
action was warranted, but that it had in fact made such a conclu-
sion. ,4 Most recently, the Court struck down the set-aside program
in Croson because the Richmond legislature failed to make the requi-
site conclusion. Disparaging Richmond's efforts as amounting to
only a "generalized assertion [ofn past discrimination," an "amor-
phous claim" of discrimination in the construction industry, and
"sheer speculation, '1 5 the Court opined that "the mere recitation of
a 'benign' or legitimate purpose for a racial classification is entitled
to little or no weight .... Racial classifications are suspect, and that
means that simple legislative assurances of good intention cannot
suffice. ' 1 5 Instead, quoting Wygant, the Court demanded " 'a strong
basis in evidence for the conclusion that remedial action was
necessary.' "97
The Court's insistence that a legislature forthrightly consider the
evidence of prior discrimination and reach a conclusion based on
that evidence before implementing an affirmative action program is
certainly warranted. Even under less rigorous equal protection
scrutiny, courts commonly inquire into the underlying legislative
deliberations to help identify unconstitutional discrimination.!', As
Justice Brennan has noted in regard to rational relation review, a
92. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478.
93. fllgant, 476 U.S. at 277 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, CJ., and Rehnquist and
O'Connor, JJ.).
94. 1! ygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (Board "must have sufficient evidence tojustify the con-
clusion that there has been prior discrimination") (Powell,J.,joined by Burger, C.J., and
Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.); id. at 291 (Board needs "information which gives them a
sufficient basis for concluding that remedial action is necessary") (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). Similarly, the actor's concession or admission that it had discriminated in the past
does not amount to a satisfactory conclusion. Id. at 279 n.5 ("Nor can the [governmen-
tal unit] insulate itself from this key constitutional question by conceding that it has
discriminated in the past, now that it is in its interest to make such a concession.") (Pow-
ell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.).
95. Crason, 109 S. Ct. at 723-24.
96. Id. at 724 (citations omitted). Cf Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648
n. 16 (1975) ("This Court need not in equal protection cases accept at face value asser-
tions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its his-
tory demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the
legislation.").
97. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 724 (quoting Wlygant, 476 U.S. at 277).
98. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976)
(classification satisfies rational basis test only if it "rationally furthers the purposes identi-
fied by the State"); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 17 (1973)
(classification satisfies rational basis test only if it "rationally furthers some legitimate,
articulated state purpose") (emphasis added in both). But cf McGowen v. Maryland, 366
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"challenged classification may be sustained only if it is rationally re-
lated to achievement of an actual legitimate governmental pur-
pose." 1m-  In the sensitive area of affirmative action, in which
legislative classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, requiring leg-
islatures to deliberate and reach conclusions regarding necessity is
especially important. The purposes of the evidentiary predicate re-
quirement-identifying the problem, tailoring the remedy, and gar-
nering public support-are best served by a legislature's careful and
honest evaluation of the evidence. 00
2. Contemporaneous Conclusions. Simply requiring the legisla-
ture to introduce evidence that it concluded that race-conscious
remedies were appropriate is not, in itself, sufficient to satisfy the
evidentiary predicate requirement. Rather, the Court must insist
that the legislature produce its contemporaneous conclusion that reme-
dial relief was necessary. Under the proposal presented here, the
legislature can sustain its burden only by introducing concrete evi-
dence that it concluded-at the time that it enacted the affirmative
action program and on the basis of the evidence gathered to that
point-that affirmative action was necessary.
Requiring such a contemporaneous conclusion, however, has
been criticized as creating a potential disincentive to legitimate af-
firmative action."" In her Wygant concurrence, Justice O'Connor
noted that "a contemporaneous or antecedent finding of past dis-
crimination by a court or other competent body is not a constitu-
tional prerequisite to a public employer's voluntary adoption of an
affirmative action plan."'1"2 While recognizing that such findings
U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (Under rational relation review, a "statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.").
99. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 188 (1981) (Brennan,
J., joined by Marshall,J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See also Gunther, supra note
6, at 21 (Court should "assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that have sub-
stantial basis in actuality, not merely conjecture").
100. It should be noted that the deliberation requirement is designed "not to redi-
rect [the legislature's] decisions; rather, the Court, in order to evaluate and rule in a
principled manner, should compel [the legislature] to act in an equally principled fash-
ion." Days, supra note 21, at 470.
101. Of course, the purpose of the evidentiary predicate generally, and the burden-
shifting regime presented here in particular, is to create a disincentive to affirmative
action that is not premised upon a legitimate need to remedy discrimination. In so do-
ing, however, no disincentive to legitimate affirmative action should be tolerated. Prop-
erly justified and properly tailored affirmative action continues to be an important
constitutional tool to ameliorate the effects of racial prejudice in our country. Any diffi-
culty a legislature may face in enacting a constitutional plan stems from the nature of
strict scrutiny itself, not from the proposal presented here.
102. ll'yganl, 476 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's argu-
ment, as a matter of precedent, is correct. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478 (plurality opinion
of Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.) ("Congress, of course, may legislate
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"obviously are [a] desirable ...evidentiary safeguard,"1l 3 Justice
O'Connor eschewed such a requirement, arguing that "[t]he impo-
sition of a requirement that public employers make findings that
they have engaged in illegal discrimination before they engage in
affirmative action programs would severely undermine public em-
ployers' incentive to meet voluntarily their civil rights obliga-
tions."'' 11 4 Such findings, she feared, could expose the public actor
to liability under Title VII and, perhaps, the equal protection clause,
thereby impeding the effort to remedy discrimination.11
5
without compiling the kind of'record' appropriate with respect to judicial or administra-
tive proceedings."); id. at 502 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Congress is not expected to act
as though it were duty bound to find facts and make conclusions of law[.]"); id. at 520
n.4 (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.) (Congress does not
need to make "particularized findings" of constitutional or statutory violations.); Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (Congress need not "make particularized
findings in order to legislate[.]"); Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91,
105 (1966) ("[Tjhe practice of relying upon the legislative record when it exists should
not be taken to show that such a record is required. . . . No case has ever held that a
record is constitutionally required."). But see supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
103. liygant, 476 U.S. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see id. at 289 (Contempora-
neous findings serve "as a means by which it can be made absolutely certain that the
governmental actor truly is attempting" to achieve a compelling governmental
purpose.).
104. llyvganl, 476 U.S. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at
364 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he requirement of a judicial determination of a
constitutional or statutory violation as a predicate for race-conscious remedial action
would be self-defeating.");Joint Statement, supra note 1, at 714 ("[lit is essential not to
deter voluntary efforts by forcing.., governments to point fingers needlessly or to make
compromising public admissions in order to establish the necessary predicate for race-
conscious remedies.").
105. llgant, 476 U.S. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The contemporaneous
finding requirement also has been criticized as unwise because it is likely to fuel existing
racial tensions in the locale, as unnecessary because of the political accountability of
legislators who enact the affirmative action program, and as unworkable because state
and local legislatures normally do not keep legislative histories. See Brief of the States of
New York, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 7-10, City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (No. 87-998); see also May v. Cooperman, 572 F.
Supp. 1561, 1564 (D.N.J. 1983) ("The NewJersey legislature does not preserve an offi-
cial record of its hearings and debates, and consequently this source of information con-
cerning the purpose of legislation is not available."). To be sure, these criticisms are
well-taken; none of them, however, is serious enough to warrant a retreat from a con-
temporaneous conclusion requirement. First, forthrightly presenting the evidentiary ba-
sis for a remedial program may anger some elements in the community, but it also will
alert the larger community to the need to act and galvanize support for the program.
Second, the Constitution requires that the decision to enact a race-conscious program
be done with utmost deliberateness; reliance on the political process alone in this con-
text has been rejected repeatedly by the Court. Finally, although state and local legisla-
tures may not keep legislative histories routinely, certainly nothing prevents these
bodies from doing so.
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This concern, while valid, does not undermine the burden-shift-
ing regime offered here. Regardless of which compelling govern-
mental interest the legislature seeks to fulfill by enacting the
affirmative action plan-whether to redress the current effects of
past governmental discrimination or to terminate governmental
complicity in private industry discrimination-satisfying the contem-
poraneous conclusion requirement does not require the legislature
to establish its own legal liability. On the contrary, according to the
Court's opinion in Croson, the evidence that a legislature must pro-
duce to support an affirmative action plan need only amount to a
"prima facie case of constitutional or statutory violation."' 0" For a
number of reasons, such a showing can be made without exposing
the government to legal liability.
If the affirmative action plan is enacted to remedy the current ef-
fects of past discrimination by the governmental entity itself, evi-
dence that the government had, in the past, illicitly considered race
in its hiring or procurement practices would suffice to justify the
affirmative action plan. Such evidence would constitute a prima fa-
cie case of disparate treatment under Title VII. 1t7 This evidence,
however, would not expose the public actor to Title VII liability be-
cause, under disparate treatment doctrine, evidence of discrimina-
tory treatment alone does not establish liability; to establish liability
for disparate treatment, intent to discriminate must be shown. The
evidence necessary to support the affirmative action plan-a prima
facie case of disparate treatment-need not include such evidence of
intent. Accordingly, affirmative action based on this compelling
governmental interest would not expose the legislature to Title VII
liability.
Furthermore, an affirmative action plan designed to end passive
governmental participation in private industry discrimination need
not establish the government's statutory or constitutional liability. If a
passive participation rationale underlay the plan, the legislature
would need to produce evidence of discriminatory practices in the
industry or a statistically significant disparity between minority and
106. 109 S. Ct. at 724. For the purposes of this Current Topic, I assume that the
Court requires an actual prima facie case of constitutional or statutory violation, not
evidence somehow "approaching a prima facie case." Id. What evidence "approaches"
a prima facie case of statutory or constitutional violation is not readily apparent. Ambi-
guity, as is obvious from the discussion in Part 1(B), supra, abounds in the Court's ap-
proach to the evidentiary predicate requirement. To regard the Court's current demand
as amounting to evidence that somehow "approaches" a prima facie case, rather than an
actual prima facie case, only would add to the existing confision.
107. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
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non-minority participation in public contracting opportunities." 8
Such a showing could constitute a prima facie case of disparate
treatment or disparate impact, '0 9 but would not expose the govern-
ment to liability. First, the discriminatory treatment shown would
pertain to the private industry's practices, not to the government's
practices. The evidence produced, accordingly, could be used only
in a Title VII suit against the private actors.'' 0 Second, since an
employer-employee relationship for Title VII purposes does not ex-
ist between a city and private entities vying for and performing city
construction contracts,' ' I no Title VII disparate impact suit against
the city could arise from the statistical disparity shown. Finally, a
constitutional disparate impact suit may be maintained only if the
plaintiff can show intent to discriminate' 12 and that the impact oc-
curred "because of" the legislature's desire to discriminate.' 13 A
showing of a prima facie case of constitutional disparate impact in
the receipt of public benefits, standing alone, does not provide this
sort of evidence. In short, the defendant legislature may fulfill the
contemporaneous conclusion requirement without producing con-
clusions of its own legal liability. Consequently, the disincentives to
affirmative action feared by Justice O'Connor are avoided.
The Federal Rules of Evidence 407 and 408 provide an additional
means to insulate a government from potential statutory or consti-
tutional liability. Courts should rely on Rules 407 and 408, "Subse-
quent Remedial Measures" and "Compromise and Offers to
Compromise," to exclude evidence developed by the government to
satisfy the contemporaneous conclusion requirement in subsequent
suits against the government alleging Title VII or equal protection
108. In Croson, the Court held that "[ilf the statistical disparity between eligible
MBEs and MBE membership [in professional associations] were great enough, an infer-
ence of discriminatory exclusion could arise. In such a case, the city would have a com-
pelling interest in preventing its tax dollars from assisting these organizations in
maintaining a racially segregated construction market." 109 S. Ct. at 726.
109. See supra note 73.
110. A Title VII disparate impact suit against private parties arising from the legisla-
ture's collection of data cannot be regarded as an unwarranted impediment to affirma-
tive action. On the contrary, such a suit should be regarded as a public good.
11. Title VII's protections apply only in an employment or potential employment
relationship. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). The letting of public works contracts to private
firms does not fall within Title VII's reach. See generallV I A. Larson, Employment Dis-
crimination: Sex §§ 5-20 - 5-22, at 2-5 - 2-19.
112. See supra note 64.
113. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (disparate im-
pact must be "because of," not "in spite of," discriminatory purpose).
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violations.' '4 These Rules, most commonly invoked in tort litiga-
tion, were designed to promote the general public policy of encour-
aging remedial action and the voluntary settlement of disputes by
excluding evidence of such actions in subsequent litigation." 1
5 Simi-
larly, precluding the use of the evidence necessary to meet the con-
temporaneous conclusion requirement in subsequent litigation
would encourage properly substantiated affirmative action by allevi-
ating the threat of collateral governmental liability.' 11
Requiring contemporaneous conclusions is the only way to assure
that the evidentiary predicate requirement has real bite.' 17 As de-
scribed above, the defendant's burden is to put forth its conclusion,
based on evidence gathered in whatever manner, that affirmative ac-
tion was warranted. The relevant inquiry, then, is the actual motiva-
tion of the legislature, not its post hoc rationalizations. If legislatures
were permitted to come into court and offer newly formed conclu-
sions regarding the need for race-conscious relief, the purposes of
the evidentiary predicate requirement would be undermined. In-
deed, a recurring problem in affirmative action litigation is that
courts are "presented with a series of post hoc arguments . . . in de-
fense of the program, along with scores of amicus briefs hypothesiz-
ing how the program might be found to accord with federal legal
and constitutional requirements."' 18 Demanding that legislatures
introduce their contemporaneous conclusions regarding the need
for affirmative action would negate this problem. I I'
114. Of course, the evidence supporting the affirmative action plan properly would
be introduced in the direct action challenging the legitimacy of the affirmative action
plan; Rules 407 and 408 would bar the use of such evidence only in unrelated suits
against the government actor.
115. See Fed. R. Evid. 407 & 408 advisory committee's notes. See also McCormick on
Evidence, supra note 43, §§ 274-75.
116. See Brief of the States of New York, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Appel-
lant at 9 n.9, City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (No. 87-998).
117. Croson's call, after all, is for strict scrutiny of all race-conscious legislation, in-
cluding affirmative action plans.
118. Days, supra note 21, at 187 (discussing the Bakke litigation).
119. This demand, however, has obvious separation of powers difficulties. As a gen-
eral rule, courts do not demand any particular mode of legislative decision-making be-
yond that specified in the Constitution. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Service v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto as violating constitutional de-
mands of bicameralism and presentment); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L.
Rev. 197, 222-44 (1976) (legislatures cannot be required to legislate in any particular
manner). However, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Fritz, 449 U.S. at 187
(Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting), the "Court has frequently recognized
that the actual purposes of Congress, rather than the post hoc justifications offered by
Government attorneys, must be the primary basis for [equal protection] analysis ......
Moreover, even if not directly required by a court, a legislature would be wise to adopt
such contemporaneous findings in order to increase the likelihood that its affirmative
action plan would pass constitutional muster.
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V Conclusion
In the aftermath of Croson, litigation challenging the sufficiency of
the evidentiary predicate for affirmative action is likely to acceler-
ate. '2 0 This Current Topic proposes that courts implement a proce-
dural regime to resolve these controversies. This regime calls for
the plaintiff challenging the affirmative action plan to bear the initial
burden of production to show that a race-based classification exists
in the affirmative action statute. The burden of production then
would shift to the defendant legislature to offer evidence that it con-
cluded, based on evidence before the legislature at the time the pro-
gram was adopted, that affirmative action was necessary to achieve a
compelling governmental interest. If the legislature meets this bur-
den, the burden of production would then shift back to the plaintiff
to show that the legislature's intent was not, in fact, to achieve a
legitimate interest. The burden of persuasion rests on the plaintiff
throughout.
Adoption of this procedural regime, while it would not alter the
substantive law of affirmative action, would assist courts greatly in
resolving controversies regarding the evidentiary predicate for af-
firmative action. By substituting a procedural approach for the cur-
rent quantitative approach, the burden-shifting process would focus
the court's and the litigants' attention on the relevant question: was
the legislature motivated, based on evidence it had gathered at the
time that the affirmative action plan was adopted, to achieve a com-
pelling governmental interest?
120. Indeed, within six weeks after Croso, was decided, two courts struck down af-
firmative action plans because of the lack of a sound evidentiary predicate. See Fiedle;
707 F. Supp. at 1016 (Wisconsin set-aside); American Subcontractors Ass'n, Ga. Chap-
ter v. Atlanta, 376 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 1989) (Atlanta set-aside). Moreover, according to an
amicus brief filed in Croson, 32 states and over 150 municipal and county governments
currently have minority business set-aside affirmative action programs. Brief of National
League of Cities, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, at App. I & I, City of
Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (No. 87-998).
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